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Race and the New Policing
Jeffrey Fagan*
Several observers credit nearly 25 years of declining crime
rates to the “New Policing” and its emphasis on advanced
statistical metrics, new forms of organizational accountability,
and aggressive tactical enforcement of minor crimes. This
model has been adopted in large and small cities, and has
been institutionalized in everyday police-citizen interactions,
especially among residents of poorer, often minority, and highercrime areas. Citizens exposed to these regimes have frequent
contact with police through investigative stops, arrests for minor
misdemeanors, and non-custody citations or summons for code
violations or vehicle infractions. Two case studies show surprising
and troubling similarities in the racial disparities in the new
policing in vastly different areas, including more frequent police
contact and new forms of monetary punishment. Low-level
“public order” crimes and misdemeanors are the starting point
for legal proceedings that over time evolve into punishments
leading to criminal records with lasting consequences. In these
regimes, warrants provide the entry point for processes that move
from civil fines to criminal punishment. The chapter concludes
with a menu of reforms to disincentivize the new policing while
creating new forms of accountability to mitigate its harms.

*
Isidor and Seville Sulzbacher Professor of Law, and Professor of Epidemiology, Columbia
University. Fagan was consultant to the U.S. Department of Justice, Special Litigation Section, in
the investigation of the Ferguson, Missouri Police Department. He also was expert for Plaintiffs
in Floyd v. City of New York challenging the constitutionality of the stop and frisk program of the
New York City Police Department. The author wishes to thank the workshop participants at the
Academy for Justice conference on criminal justice reform for very helpful comments. Nicola
Anna Cohen and Chris E. Mendez provided outstanding research assistance. All opinions and
any errors are those of the author alone. Portions of this chapter appeared in Jeffrey Fagan &
Elliott Ash, New Policing, New Segregation, 105 GEO. L.J. ONLINE (forthcoming 2017).
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INTRODUCTION

In popular and political culture, many observers credit nearly 25 years of
declining crime rates to the “New Policing.”1 Breaking with a past tradition
of “reactive policing,” the New Policing emphasizes advanced statistical
metrics, new forms of organizational accountability, and aggressive tactical
enforcement of public-order crimes or violations.2 The existing scholarship
on the new policing has focused mainly on the nation’s major cities, where
high population density, elevated crime rates, and sizable police forces provide
pressurized laboratories for police experimentation, often in the spotlight of
political scrutiny.
This scholarship has generally overlooked how the New Policing has been
woven into the social, political, and legal fabrics of smaller, less densely populated
areas. These areas are characterized by more intimate and individualized
relationships among citizens, courts, and police, as well as closely spaced local
boundaries with a considerable flow of persons through small administrative
entities such as villages and towns. Crime rates rarely approach those of urban
centers, although these places are hardly strangers to violence or other crime.3
New attention to crime in the smaller areas followed the 2014 Department of
Justice investigation into policing in Ferguson, Missouri, which revealed how
the New Policing unfolds in these less densely populated areas.4
These two policing contexts showed that the differences are far less than
one might imagine. Residents of cities have frequent contact with police in the
form of stop-and-frisk encounters—investigative stops or field interrogations
based on low levels of suspicion.5 High rates of citations (summons) and
1.
See, e.g., Philip B. Heymann, The New Policing, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 407, 413–14 (2000);
see also FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, THE CITY THAT BECAME SAFE: NEW YORK’S LESSONS FOR URBAN CRIME AND
ITS CONTROL x–xi (2011). For a review, see Steven D. Levitt, Understanding Why Crime Fell in the
1990s: Four Factors that Explain the Decline and Six that Do Not, 18 J. ECON. PERSP. 163, 171–81
(2004).
2.
See WILLIAM BRATTON & PETER KNOBLER, THE TURNAROUND: HOW AMERICA’S TOP
COP REVERSED THE CRIME EPIDEMIC 239 (1998); CHRISTOPHER DICKEY, SECURING THE CITY:
INSIDE AMERICA’S BEST COUNTERTERROR FORCE—THE NYPD 106 (2010); GEORGE L. KELLING
& CATHERINE M. COLES, FIXING BROKEN WINDOWS: RESTORING ORDER AND REDUCING CRIME
IN OUR COMMUNITIES 188–91 (1996).
3.
See generally Allen E. Liska, John R. Logan & Paul E. Bellair, Race and Violent Crime in the
Suburbs 63 AMER. SOC. REV. 27 (1998).
4.
See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON POLICE
DEPARTMENT 2–6 (2015) [hereinafter FERGUSON REPORT].
5.
See Henry F. Fradella & Michael D. White, “Stop-and-Frisk,” in the present Volume;
Tracey L. Meares, Programming Errors: Understanding the Constitutionality of Stop-and-Frisk as a
Program, Not an Incident, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 159, 168–69, 175–76 (2015).
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3059117
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misdemeanor arrests also draw people into systems of legal sanctions and
control, often for low-level, nonviolent offenses or administrative codes.6
Arrests require court appearances, even if a summons is issued in lieu of custody.
Failure to appear in court or pay a fine can result in an arrest warrant. For those
taken into custody, arrest requires posting bail for those not granted release
on their own recognizance, or stays of varying length in pretrial detention for
those unable to make bail.7 Summons for violations of administrative codes,
vehicular violations, and other civil ordinances also are a staple of these police
practices, resulting in fines or repetitive court appearances.8
An additional line of scholarship has looked more closely at how the tactics
of the New Policing have become institutionalized in police-citizen interactions
in the everyday lives of residents of poorer, predominantly minority, and highercrime areas of the nation’s cities. The internalization of harsh policing into
everyday social interactions can produce cynicism toward law and legal actors,
and a withdrawal of citizens from cooperation with the police to control crime.9
Residents of smaller areas face parallel issues. In these areas, despite generally
lower crime rates, policing takes a different form: widespread pretextual traffic
stops, extensive use of citations for vehicle defects,10 and citations for traffic
violations (usually speeding) or administrative codes (high weeds on the
property).11 This policing model can and often does result in fines, arrests and
summonses requiring multiple court appearances. Few of these contacts result
6.
See Alexandra Natapoff, “Misdemeanors,” in Volume 1 of the present Report [hereinafter
Natapoff Chapter]; Issa Kohler-Hausmann, Managerial Justice and Mass Misdemeanors, 66 STAN.
L. REV. 611, 639, 668 (2014); Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanors, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 1313, 1358–
59 (2012).
7.
See Megan Stevenson & Sandra G. Mayson, “Pretrial Detention and Bail,” in Volume 3 of
the present Report.
8.
See Beth A. Colgan, “Fines, Fees, and Forfeitures,” in Volume 4 of the present Report; JACK
MAPLE & CHRIS MITCHELL, THE CRIME FIGHTER: PUTTING THE BAD GUYS OUT OF BUSINESS 214
(2000).
9.
See David A. Harris, The Dangers of Racialized Perceptions and Thinking by Law
Enforcement, in DEADLY INJUSTICE: TRAYVON MARTIN, RACE, AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE
SYSTEM 146, 155–56 (Devon Johnson et al. eds., 2015). See generally CHARLES R. EPP, STEVEN
MAYNARD-MOODY & DONALD P. HAIDER-MARKEL, PULLED OVER: HOW POLICE STOPS DEFINE
RACE AND CITIZENSHIP (2014); Monica C. Bell, Police Reform and the Dismantling of Legal
Cynicism, 126 YALE L.J. (forthcoming 2017); Mark T. Berg et al., Cynical Streets: Neighborhood
Social Processes and Perceptions of Criminal Injustice, 54 CRIMINOLOGY 520 (2016); Matthew
Desmond, Andrew V. Papachristos & David S. Kirk, Police Violence and Citizen Crime Reporting
in the Black Community, 81 AMER. SOC. REV. 857 (2016).
10.
Such as broken taillights or expired registrations. For a discussion of pretextual stops and
racial profiling, see David A. Harris, “Racial Profiling,” in the present Volume.
11.
FERGUSON REPORT, supra note 4.
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3059117
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in jail time, but many result in monetary costs for fees as well as fines and other
financial sanctions.12 These financial burdens can metastasize from simple
fines to warrants, from warrants to criminal arrests, and further to more severe
penalties and a criminal conviction. In turn, exposure to criminal punishment
imposes social and economic burdens with both near- and long-term impacts
on employment, housing, and other social assets.
This chapter explores the design of these regimes and their impacts
on citizens’ lives. In both cities and small places, policing has evolved from
discretionary enforcement of civil and criminal codes to programmatic efforts
to use legal sanctions that entangle citizens in an administrative regime with
punitive consequences. These regimes of investigative stops, misdemeanor
arrests and civil summonses are influenced by, and draw justifying ideology
from, practices common to “Broken Windows” models of policing that are now
common in cities across the United States.13 Broken Windows policing, with
its focus on controlling social disorder, overlaps with proactive tactics such as
stop-and-frisk, and the regimes of intensive use of misdemeanor arrests. In
this design, the adjudication of guilt or innocence is replaced by a system that
imposes social controls on the one hand, and a latent fiscal and social tax on
the other.14 That these taxes fall most heavily on poor, non-White people is a
significant feature of the New Policing.
Part I of the chapter provides case studies of New York and Ferguson,
illustrating how the New Policing works in these two different contexts,
especially the racial disenfranchisement that seems an inevitable outcome of
these regimes. Part II discusses the consequences that citizens are assessed,
including potential long-term consequences. Part III concludes the chapter
with proposals for reform that can cabin these tactics and redirect police
attention to more serious forms of crime.

12.
See Colgan, supra note 8; Wayne A. Logan & Ronald F. Wright, Mercenary Criminal
Justice, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 1175, 1186–1189. See generally ALEXES HARRIS, A POUND OF FLESH:
MONETARY SANCTIONS AS A PUNISHMENT FOR THE POOR 26–46 (2016); Jeffrey Fagan & Elliott
Ash, New Policing, New Segregation, 106 GEO. L. J. ONLINE (forthcoming 2017).
13.
BRATTON & KNOBLER, supra note 2, at 239; DICKEY, supra note 2, at 106; KELLING & COLES,
supra note 2, at 188–91.
14.
Kohler-Hausmann, supra note 6.
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I. THE NEW POLICING
A. NEW YORK
In both popular and political culture, New York City epitomizes the New
Policing. The city’s policing regime in fact sustained much of the policy and
empirical literature on the nationwide crime decline throughout the second half
of the 1990s and for years after. The theory of “Broken Windows” and policing
disorder animated the New Policing,15 and was put into practice in the early
1990s. The theory suggested that the appearance of social or physical disorder
signaled vulnerability to would-be criminal offenders and in turn increased
crime rates. The practical application of the theory was a broad-based program
of investigative stops (stop-question-and-frisk, or SQF), misdemeanor arrests,
and summons for non-criminal violations of administrative codes. Officers
were deployed strategically based on crime mapping and metrics, and managers
were closely monitored by police executives for their impacts on crime.
“Proactivity” in the form of Terry stops16 and “vigorous enforcement of laws
against relatively minor [misdemeanor] offenses” 17 became core elements of
the New Policing.18 Other research portrayed proactivity as a mixture of drug
enforcement and community policing.19 Empirical research showed mixed
support for the theory.20 Early research showed that aggressive enforcement of
minor crimes—usually through arrest—deterred crime by signaling the risks

15.
George L. Kelling & James Q. Wilson, Broken Windows: The Police and Neighborhood
Safety, THE ATLANTIC (Mar. 1982), http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1982/03/
broken-windows/304465/.
16.
See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). Terry permitted temporary stops and detentions
based on reasonable suspicion that crime was “afoot,” supplanting the more demanding probable
cause standard and memorializing police discretion as the gateway to street stops. Id. at 30.
17.
Charis E. Kubrin et al., Proactive Policing and Robbery Rates Across U.S. Cities, 48
CRIMINOLOGY 57, 57 (2010).
18.
The original Broken Windows essay, whose ideas informed the New Policing and its
proactive prong, argued that arrest should be a last resort when other efforts failed to ameliorate
the disorderly conditions that invite crime. Kelling & Wilson, supra note 15. By 2000, Kelling
had embraced the notion of using arrest authority systematically and aggressively to stop minor
crime from growing into more serious crime patterns and problems. See KELLING & COLES, supra
note 2, at 108–56.
19.
See, e.g., Jon B. Gould & Stephen D. Mastrofski, Suspect Searches: Assessing Police Behavior
Under the U.S. Constitution, 3 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 315, 318 (2004).
20.
See, e.g., WESLEY G. SKOGAN, DISORDER AND DECLINE: CRIME AND THE SPIRAL OF DECAY
IN AMERICAN NEIGHBORHOODS 73–75 (1992).
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of detection and punishment to criminal offenders.21 However, reanalyses of
those data undermined Broken Windows’ claims.22 One study showed a sharp
decline in gun violence in New York City in the early 1990s and gave partial
credit to new police tactics, but emphasized the epidemic nature of the crime
increase and decline.23 Other work credited aggressive policing in the form
of drug-related misdemeanor arrests for the reduction in murder and other
violence in New York City in the 1990s.24 Others found very small effects of
misdemeanor arrests on crime,25 while some studies simply rejected the causal
claims of New Policing advocates.26 Other research challenged the core notions

21.
See Jacqueline Cohen & Jens Ludwig, Policing Crime Guns, in EVALUATING GUN POLICY:
EFFECTS ON CRIME AND VIOLENCE 217, 238–39 (Jens Ludwig & Philip J. Cook eds., 2003);
Robert J. Sampson & Jacqueline Cohen, Deterrent Effects of the Police on Crime: A Replication and
Theoretical Extension, 22 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 163, 183–85 (1988). See generally Daniel S. Nagin,
“Deterrence,” in Volume 4 of the present Report; Daniel S. Nagin, Deterrence in the 21st Century:
A Review of the Evidence, 42 CRIME & JUSTICE 199-263 (2013).
22.
See Bernard E. Harcourt, Reflecting on the Subject: A Critique of the Social Influence
Conception of Deterrence, the Broken Windows Theory, and Order-Maintenance Policing New York
Style, 97 MICH. L. REV. 291, 312–27 (1998).
23.
Jeffrey Fagan et al., Declining Homicide in New York City: A Tale of Two Trends, 88 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1277, 1297–98, 1313–16 (1998).
24.
Hope Corman & Naci Mocan, Carrots, Sticks, and Broken Windows, 48 J.L. & ECON. 235,
261–63 (2005).
25.
See, e.g., Richard Rosenfeld & Robert Fornango, The Impact of Economic Conditions on
Robbery and Property Crime: The Role of Consumer Sentiment, 45 CRIMINOLOGY 735, 750 (2007).
26.
BERNARD HARCOURT, ILLUSION OF ORDER: THE FALSE PROMISE OF BROKEN WINDOWS POLICING
8–11 (2001); ANDREW KARMEN, NEW YORK MURDER MYSTERY 117–21 (2000); Judith A. Greene, Zero
Tolerance: A Case Study of Police Policies and Practices in New York City, 45 CRIME & DELINQ.
171, 177–78 (1999); Bernard E. Harcourt & Jens Ludwig, Broken Windows: New Evidence from
New York City and a Five-City Social Experiment, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 271, 317–20 (2006); Ana
Joanes, Does the New York City Police Department Deserve Credit for the Decline in New York City’s
Homicide Rates? A Cross-City Comparison of Policing Strategies and Homicide Rates, 33 COLUM. J.L.
& SOC. PROBS. 265, 303–304 (1999); Richard Rosenfeld et al., The Impact of Order-Maintenance
Policing on New York City Homicide and Robbery Rates: 1988-2001, 45 CRIMINOLOGY 355, 377
(2007). But see ZIMRING, supra note 1, at 149; FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, THE GREAT AMERICAN CRIME
DECLINE 155–56 (2006).
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of the disorder-crime relationship, showing that the connections between
crime and disorder are uncertain.27
B. RACE AND THE NEW POLICING IN NEW YORK
Race is one of two components of these policing regimes that expose its
fault lines.28
In New York, proactivity resulted in very high rates of street stops,
misdemeanor arrests, and court summonses, all of which potentially swept up
neighborhood residents into legal controls, disproportionately to both racial
composition and local crime rates, and with little to show for it.29 From 2004 to
2014, police in New York recorded 4,811,769 stops.30 Stops were concentrated
in police precincts and census tracts with high proportions of Black, Black
Hispanic and White Hispanic population, after controlling for local crime
rates.31 In other words, rather than allocating stops according to local crime
rates, as theory would dictate, there were more officers per crime and more
stops per crime in areas with higher concentrations of Black and Latino
populations. Compounding the unequal distribution of policing, stops rarely

27.
HARCOURT, ILLUSION OF ORDER, supra note 26, at 309; RALPH B. TAYLOR, BREAKING AWAY FROM
BROKEN WINDOWS 18 (2000) (finding no evidence that crime is related to disorder); Bernard E.
Harcourt & Jens Ludwig, Reefer Madness: Broken Windows Policing and Misdemeanor Marijuana
Arrests In New York City, 1989-2000, 6 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 165, 176 (2007); Robert J.
Sampson & Stephen W. Raudenbush, Systematic Social Observation of Public Spaces: A New Look
at Disorder in Urban Neighborhoods, 105 AM. J. SOC. 603, 637–38 (1999) (finding no direct link
between disorder and crime). But see GEORGE L. KELLING & WILLIAM H. SOUSA, JR., DO POLICE
MATTER? AN ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACT OF NEW YORK CITY’S POLICE REFORMS 18 (2001) (finding
evidence that crime is related to disorder); SKOGAN, supra note 20, at 10, Corman & Mocan, supra
note 24, at 262; Rosenfeld et al., supra note 26, at 366–67.
28.
The other is the imposition of transactional costs both monetary and legal. I discuss that next.
29.
Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d. 540 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). See Report of Jeffrey
Fagan, Ph.D., at tbls. 5–9, Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (No. 08
Civ. 01034 (SAS)); Sharad Goel et al., Combatting Police Discrimination in an Age of Big Data, 20
NEW CRIM. L. REV. 181-232 (2017); see also Fradella & White, supra note 5.
30.
Stop, Question and Frisk Database, N.Y.C. POLICE DEP’T, http://www.nyc.gov/html/nypd/
html/analysis_and_planning/stop_question_and_frisk_report.shtml (last visited Mar. 23, 2017).
31.
See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Fagan et al., Street Stops and Broken Windows Revisited: The Demography
and Logic of Proactive Policing in a Safe and Changing City, in RACE, ETHNICITY, AND POLICING 309,
309–10 (Stephen K. Rice & Michael D. White eds., 2010). See also Floyd, 959 F. Supp. 2d. at 560,
587, 589, 661.
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resulted in arrests or seizures of contraband.32 The few stops that did result
in arrests rarely involved serious crimes, and few resulted in convictions or
punishment.33
Figure 1. Percent Differences in Stop Outcomes by Suspect Race,
New York City, 2004-14
Percent Difference Compared to White Suspects
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33.
See ERIC T. SCHNEIDERMAN, N.Y. STATE OFFICE OF THE ATT’Y GEN., A REPORT ON ARRESTS ARISING
FROM THE NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT’S STOP-AND-FRISK PRACTICES 8–9 app. G (2013).
34.
See, e.g., Amanda Geller et al., Aggressive Policing and the Mental Health of Young Urban
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10 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 335, 343 (2011).
343
(2011).
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4.7% more often than Whites, White Hispanics 6.7% more often than Whites,
and Black Hispanics 7.2% more often than Whites. These differences all were
statistically significant. But police also conduct many frisks where there was
no indication of the presence of a weapon or violent behavior either in the
suspected crime or in the suspicion bases of the stop. The second set of bars in
Figure 1 describes these as unproductive frisks. Again, police conducted these
frisks significantly more likely for three non-White racial or ethnic groups
compared to Whites.
Two additional sets of comparisons show differences by race in the use of
force during a stop, and also for the “unnecessary” use of force: that is, force
used in the absence of either weapons or violent behavior in the reason for
the stop.35 Force was used 2.8% more often for Black suspects compared to
Whites, 4.0% for White Hispanics, and 5.1% for Black Hispanics. Unnecessary
force rates were consistently higher for non-White suspects compared to
White suspects. These difference in both force and unnecessary force also were
statistically significant. One implication of these analyses of the outcomes of
frequent and racially skewed stops is that a resident of—or visitor to—minority
neighborhoods under the New Policing moves about in their everyday social
interactions knowing that they face nonconsensual police contact that is
procedurally punitive even though there often is at best weak evidence of
criminal wrongdoing.
Figure 2. Odds Ratios of Sanction Rates by Suspect Race,
New York City, 2004-12
Odd Ratio Compard to White Suspects
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See generally L. Song Richardson, “Police Use of Force,” in the present Volume.
This duality for Black and other non-White suspects—arrests that lead to no charges or nonserious charges, coupled with a greater risk of a criminal sanction and incarceration—seem to be
present in tandem in this part of the New Policing. We observe much the same for Black
Hispanic suspects, although their incarceration risks at the end of the process are not
significantly greater than White suspects. The results are similar for White Hispanic suspects,
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The fate of stops in these cases is another dimension to assess the impacts of
the New Policing. Figure 2 and Appendix Table 2 show the odds ratio of racial
disparities in the outcomes of street stops from 2009 to 2012 from the decision
to arrest through sentencing for those cases that survive into court, comparing
non-White to White suspects. An odds ratio of 0 indicates no difference, and a
negative value indicates that the outcome is less likely for that group compared
to Whites. In 12 of 15 analyses in Appendix Table 2 testing for disparate
treatment by race or ethnicity, we observe significant effects that suggest
harsher treatment of Black, Black Hispanic, and White Hispanic suspects.
Whether the stop resulted in an arrest, indicative of probable cause and
a higher standard for the contact than the Terry standards of reasonable
suspicion,36 is the first dimension of sanction outcomes. Figure 2 shows
that relative to White suspects, all three groups of non-White suspects were
more likely to be arrested if stopped but less likely to be arraigned if arrested.
Details of the reasons for the attrition of nearly 18% of the arrests were not
available. Generally, cases may drop out if quashed at the precinct by police
supervisors, or if they were declined for prosecution due to legal insufficiency
or other evidentiary concerns.37 The lower arraignment rate suggests the legal
insufficiency of these arrests. The fact of an arrest that is dropped transforms the
arrest process into a form of front-end punishment for non-White suspects, yet
another expression of the managerialism38 that characterizes the New Policing.

36.
Jeffrey Fagan, Terry’s Original Sin, 2016 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 101, 111–13.
37.
Josh Bowers, Legal Guilt, Normative Innocence, and the Equitable Decision Not to
Prosecute, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1655, 1655–56, 1656 n.1 (2010). Bowers suggests that prosecutors
inherently have the power not to charge and do so for three possible reasons: legal reasons (such
as insufficient evidence); administrative reasons (such as prioritizing case assignments, inability
to produce complaining witnesses); and equitable reasons (such as moral-judgment-based
assessments of the seriousness of the crime, the culpability of the suspect, or the character of
actors). Id. at 1656–57.
38.
Kohler-Hausmann, supra note 6, at 648–49
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Once arraigned, non-White suspects are 27.7% to 38.6% more likely to be
convicted, but for less serious crimes. Appendix Table 2 shows that if convicted,
non-White suspects are 45.3% to 87.8% more likely to be convicted of a less
serious charge with a lower sentencing tariff. But, Figure 2 shows that even with
lower convictions charges, Black defendants relative to Whites are more likely
(31.2%) to serve time in jail or be sentenced to prison.39
This duality for Black and other non-White suspects—arrests that lead to
no charges or non-serious charges, coupled with a greater risk of a criminal
sanction and incarceration—seem to be present in tandem in this part of the
New Policing. We observe much the same for Black Hispanic suspects, although
their incarceration risks at the end of the process are not significantly greater
than White suspects. The results are similar for White Hispanic suspects, with
the exception of arrests conditional on stops. These events form a grinding
process of accumulating arrest records that may increase in number over time
to produce at some tipping point a spell of incarceration. The consequences
are severe, though. Even if there is low risk of jail time, the effect of imposing
a criminal conviction becomes nearly indelible. A criminal conviction is a
permanent mark, one that is not easily removed through sealing or expunging
of records, and that can be a negative asset when seeking employment in the
private sector or several types of housing.40
C. FERGUSON
Long before the protests erupted in Ferguson over the shooting of unarmed
Black teenager Michael Brown by White officer Darren Wilson, the Ferguson
Police Department (FPD) practiced its own version of New Policing.41 But
unlike the high-crime urban laboratories of the New Policing, Ferguson was not
plagued by high rates of violent crime; in fact, violent crime rates were declining
39.
Results show odds ratio is compared to White suspects. N=2,396,314 stops. The total
arrests recorded were 148,880; 7,500 cases were eliminated because of duplicate or incomplete
arrest identifiers. In addition, 146,323 cases resulted in issuance of a summons. Logistic
regressions for arrest and arraignment were estimated with controls for suspect age and
gender, and controls effects for year and arrest charge. Models for arraignment were estimated
conditional on probability of any sanction (arrest or summons). Models for conviction (plea)
were ordered probits estimated conditional on arraignment. Models for incarceration were
order probit regressions based on probability of conviction. Robust standard errors in all models
were clustered by police precinct. For a discussion of the impact of race on sentencing, see Cassia
Spohn, “Race and Sentencing Disparity,” in Volume 4 of the present Report.
40.
Devah Pager, The Mark of a Criminal Record, 108 AM. J. SOC. 937, 959–60 (2003); see also
James Jacobs & Tamara Crepet, The Expanding Scope, Use, and Availability of Criminal Records,
11 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 177, 207–10 (2008).
41.
FERGUSON REPORT, supra note 4, at 3–5.
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in Ferguson for several years preceding the Michael Brown shooting and the
protests.42 Instead, small towns like Ferguson turned to a model based on the
saturation of misdemeanor enforcement, traffic and other vehicular codes, and
enforcement of civil codes. In this way, the policing model in Ferguson reflected
a variation of New Policing that closely resembles the type of managerial justice
that characterized misdemeanor enforcement in urban areas. The reliance on
code enforcement, traffic enforcement, and misdemeanor arrests suggests a
thread connecting the order-maintenance prong of New Policing in cities with
New Policing in less urban locales such as Ferguson.
What made Ferguson unique was the profit motive that had been injected into
the policing regime.43 The policing regime was designed to extract revenue not
only from Ferguson residents, but also from people passing through Ferguson
from nearby municipalities. The proximity of Ferguson to its surrounding areas
created a spatial concentration that broadened the reach of FPD policing to
non-residents.44 FPD enforcement was tailored to this revenue-generating goal.
The offenses cited by FPD officers in traffic stops and other citizen contacts
generated a volume of fees and fines that were integrated into the municipal
budget.45 When persons failed to pay these financial penalties, further fees
and interest followed, compounding debt. These non-criminal court actions
often grew into criminal matters when failures to pay led to criminal warrants.
Once arrested for the outstanding warrants, the compounding of LFOs
described earlier sank these individuals, already poor, deeper into poverty.46
The racial component of these policing dynamics compounded the historical
racial inequalities in Ferguson.47
D. RACE AND POLICING IN FERGUSON
The Ferguson Report not only documented extraordinary racial disparities in
both traffic enforcement but also in enforcement of civil codes.48 Several measures
of discretionary police behavior more closely show the role of race in traffic
enforcement. The implications of stops, tickets, arrests, and seizures are evident
not only in the generation of revenue, but also in the creation of criminal liability.
42.
Id. at 7 n.7 (indicating that the records of the FPD and the FBI “show[ed] a downward
trend in serious crime” from 2004–2014).
43.
Id. at 2; see also Developments in the Law: Policing and Profit, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1723,
1734–35 (2015).
44.
Fagan & Ash, supra note 12, fig.2.
45.
FERGUSON REPORT, supra note 4, at 2.
46.
Id. at 4.
47.
Id. at 76–78.
48.
Id. at 7.
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The regression results in Figure 3 and Appendix Table 3 tested for racial
differences in police decisions during these stops.49 The results are conditioned
at predicate stages of each case: whether contraband is seized depends on
whether the driver or vehicle is searched, and whether a warrant arrest is the
reason for the arrest compared to other reasons. These regressions, like those
in previous tables, provide controls for several non-race factors—in particular
the stated reason for the stop—that may be correlated both with race and
policing choices.
Controlling for the reason for the stop, the first column in Figure 3 shows
that Black drivers were 35% more likely than Whites to be ticketed pursuant to a
stop. The second column shows that Blacks are 93% more likely, or nearly twice
as likely, to be arrested.50 These statistically significant results suggest that these
patterns are unlikely to occur by chance alone. The search results in the third
column show that Blacks are 67% more likely than Whites to have their vehicle
searched once stopped, again a statistically significant effect. But the fourth
column shows that seizures of contraband are less likely for vehicles operated
by Blacks, conditional on being searched. In this case, the 26% lower odds of a
“hit” (seizure) for Blacks (not statistically significant) suggests that stops and
searches are a form of preference-based rather than statistical discrimination.51
Why bother to continue stopping and searching Black motorists if there is
no greater likelihood that those searches will pay off, other than a preference to
stop Blacks? This is the essence of preference-based discrimination under the
New Policing. Statistical discrimination would reflect a tendency to stop one
group at a higher rate than another group based on observable characteristics
such as known crime rates. But preference-based discrimination would reflect
a tendency to prefer one group for stops over others based on factors unrelated
to observable differences in the targeted behavior, such as race. Preferencebased discrimination suggests that the purpose of stops is to select a particular
group for criminal justice attention, independent of the likelihood of a positive
result. If police in Ferguson are stopping Blacks more often without finding
49.
Table 3 compares the probability of each of several outcomes of a police encounter by
race as a percentage of the number of stops, and then comparing the rates by race to those of
Whites. See Fagan & Ash, supra note 12, tbl.4 & fig.3.
50.
It is possible that drivers exhibit unreported behaviors that might lead to a decision to
sanction them. If there are such differences in suspect behavior leading to tickets or arrests, those
behaviors are not described by the officers in official reports.
51.
Jeff Dominitz & John Knowles, Crime Minimization and Racial Bias: What Can We Learn
from Police Search Data?, 116 ECON. J. F368, F379 (2006); see also Kate Antonovics & Brian G.
Knight, A New Look at Racial Profiling: Evidence from the Boston Police Department, 91 REV. ECON.
& STAT. 163 (2009).
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Figure 3. Odds Ratio by Race Effects on Stop
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costs to the liberty costs of warrant arrests. Here, if the goal of policing is to
detect persons with outstanding warrants and continue the economic drain
on those defendants, then the police are in fact maximizing on that goal—a
form of statistical discrimination. But it is the predicate processes of stops,
citations, and searches that lead to the issuance of a warrant that is infected
with race-based and preferential discrimination. In other words, if police are
stopping Black motorists with the hope of getting a warrant arrest, the ocean
of outstanding warrants among Black drivers makes this a good bet by the FPD.
Once these cases get to court, the pattern of racially disparate policing
continues. An important mechanism for the proliferation of warrants and
subsequent warrant arrests is the operation of the municipal court system in
Ferguson, and elsewhere in the northeastern corner of St. Louis County.56 The
processes described in Figure 3 and Appendix Table 3 result in a racially skewed
population in the Municipal Court, where most of these cases are resolved.
Although Blacks are 67% of the Ferguson population, they are 74% of Municipal
Court defendants. Within that court population, they are 81% of the population
receiving summonses, 91% of those with warrants issued for their arrest, and
95% of the persons arrested.57 Black defendants in the Municipal Court average
3.5 citations per appearance, about 50% more than the rate of 2.3 summonses
per White defendants. Black defendants average 4.7 warrants per defendant,
compared to 1.4 warrants per White defendant. They have 2.25 arrests each
(relative to just 0.3 for Whites). Finally, as shown earlier, Blacks have more
warrants and arrests when controlling for the number of summonses.
Figure 4 summarizes a series of regressions showing outcomes of cases by
race once they enter the Municipal Court.58 The figure reports the average
percent difference in each outcome between Black and White defendants,
providing simple measures of racial disparities in misdemeanor justice. By
using percentages, the results are comparable on the same scale.

56.
See THOMAS HARVEY ET AL., ARCH CITY DEFENDERS: MUNICIPAL COURTS WHITE PAPER 27–37
(2014), https://www.courts.mo.gov/file.jsp?id=98433.
57.
Fagan & Ash, supra note 12.
58.
The full results are shown in Fagan & Ash, supra note 12, tbl. 6. The regressions include
several covariates that measure non-race factors, both legal and demographic. We also include
fixed effects for the range of offenses that bring people into the Municipal Court and that one
would expect to affect penalties and other outcomes. The standard errors in the regressions are
clustered by the defendant’s resident zip code, to adjust the significance estimates for local crime
and social conditions.
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median household income of barely more than $40,000.59 Finally, Blacks are
significantly more likely to have a warrant issued and more likely to be arrested.
Strikingly, Blacks are 15% more likely to have a warrant issued than Whites.
This may reflect the stricter monetary penalties resulting in more delinquency,
or it may again reflect an independent source of racially based treatment.
II. THE NEW POLICING AS A LATENT RACIAL TAX
The New Policing exacts two types of latent taxes on persons who are
brought into the criminal justice system, whether by stops and arrests, as in
New York, or through a program of saturated traffic enforcement in Ferguson.
One regime starts with the imposition of monetary taxes that morph into
criminal liability, while the other starts with panvasive and intrusive street
stops that sweep suspects into the police gaze and for some, into the courts and
jails.60 Each has a monetary component and each can end with a stigmatizing
criminal conviction.
Monetary penalties have proven to be quite popular in state legislatures and
in criminal legal institutions.61 Fines are seen both as a legitimate deterrent
to wrongdoing and a means of transferring the costs of criminal justice
administration (courts, police, prisons, etc.) to the prisoner, costs that would
otherwise fall on ostensibly law-abiding taxpayers. Further, administrative fees
allow state and local legislators to get around tough rules limiting local tax
increases. Fines and administrative fees therefore provide a path to budgetary
relief with limited legislative or court oversight. Much of this is administrative,
not statutory, rule-making, a tax that is not called a tax.
But the impetus for this form of taxation runs deeper into the culture
of criminal justice. Professor Alexes Harris shows that it is not simply fiscal
interests in recuperating costs from poor defendants that seemed to animate
the institutional postures; rather, Professor Harris shows how these fines are
shaped by perceptions of criminal defendants—regardless of crime severity—

59.
Fagan & Ash, supra note 12, tbl. 1.
60.
See Christopher Slobogin, Panvasive Surveillance, Political Process Theory and the
Nondelegation Doctrine, 102 GEO. L. J. 1721, 1723 (2014) (characterizing “panvasive” surveillance
as large scale police mobilization to surveil and contact citizens without reasonable suspicion,
most of whom are innocent of any wrongdoing).
61.
Policing and Profit, supra note 43.
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as deserving of this extra burden beyond formal punishments.62 In effect, this
view of defendants reflects a justifying ideology about the undeserving offender
that links money to crime and punishment.63
A. CRIMINAL JUSTICE TAXES
The expansion of misdemeanor justice, driven in part by the New Policing,
commonly imposes non-trivial fines and fees at each stage of the process, from
arrest to efforts to expunge criminal records.64 Ferguson illustrates this newly
expanded system of fee-based criminal justice that taxes defendants. Disparate
racial treatment at each stage of processing in Ferguson skews the tax toward
minorities, whose economic position often is more tenuous than that of their
White counterparts. Traffic stops lead to tickets and fines, and the inability to
pay those fines can lead to criminal arrests. Once arrested, the inability to post
bail raises issues both before and after adjudication. Defendants charged with
minor misdemeanors or outstanding warrants may have difficulty retaining
counsel if required to pay a fee to establish indigency, or the assignment of
counsel may be delayed during the scramble to post bond in the interim
between arrest and first appearance.65
The risk of fee default at that stage leading to pretrial delay or—worse—
pretrial detention in turn leads to the risk of an adverse court outcome in terms
of charging and sentencing. Empirical studies confirm that defendants who are
detained pretrial are more likely to be convicted by plea or trial, and also receive

62.
HARRIS, supra note 12, at 14–15; see also Alan T. Harland, Monetary Remedies for the
Victims of Crime: Assessing the Role of the Criminal Courts, 30 UCLA L. REV. 52 (1982). Having
offenders pay for pre-adjudication costs, including filing fees, and vetting their eligibility for
indigent defense, presumes that they are in fact guilty of a criminal offense or a civil violation.
Given the high rates of plea bargaining in the lower criminal courts in misdemeanor cases, as
well as the high rates of prosecutorial declination and court dismissal, this is an assumption
fraught with risk and potentially error.
63.
See, e.g., John T. Jost & Orsolya Hunyady, Antecedents and Consequences of SystemJustifying Ideologies, 14 CURRENT DIRECTIONS PSYCHOL. SCI. 260, 260 (2005).
64.
Logan & Wright, supra note 12, at 1185; see also HARRIS, supra note 12, at 18, 42. Although
there are monetary burdens associated with felony case processing, such as taxing offenders to
pay for probation or drug treatment or electronic monitoring in lieu of jail, these measures affect
a smaller population facing prison.
65.
See generally Eve Brensike Primus, “Defense Counsel and Public Defense,” in Volume 3 of
the present Report.
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harsher sentences.66 Failure to pay the latent taxes of fees, in effect, prejudices
court outcomes and all the burdens that come with either a monetary fine or
a criminal conviction. In effect, these regimes require defendants—assuming
they can afford them—to pay fees and costs for the very court processes
that lead to their punishment.67 It seems that the municipality of Ferguson
was cloaking its taxing power in the exercise of police power by functionally
equating the power of taxation with the power to punish.
Criminal justice taxation in New York had features similar to Ferguson, but
also distinct to the managerialism that characterized the New Policing there. In
this setting, transactional costs exact a different tax on defendants, but a tax that
still can lead to criminal conviction and associated stigma and burdens. Black
and Latino suspects face stops with no arrests, and often, arrests with either no
charges or trivial charges. Still, these cases require repeated court appearances
over several months before they reach a conclusion. Monetary costs follow,
whether in the form of processing fees for cases or for lost time and wages from
the disruption of repeat court appearances.
If convicted, usually for the least serious grades of misdemeanors, the
stigma of a criminal conviction attaches, creating social and economic burdens
and deficits.68 At the same time, for the few cases that proceed to court, most
plead out after long delays and multiple court appearances, coupled with a
greater risk of a criminal sanction and incarceration. Overall, summonses are
as often dismissed as they are sustained, if not more often, but are more likely
to be dismissed when issued in neighborhoods with higher proportions of
Black residents.69 Those that are sustained often result in monetary costs, an
example of the burdens of legal financial obligations.70 But whether dismissed
or sustained, there are costs (beyond the fine) attached to court appearances
66.
Paul Heaton, Sandra Mayson & Megan Stevenson, The Downstream Consequences of
Pretrial Detention, 69 STAN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017) (showing evidence detained defendants
are 25% more likely than similarly situated releasees to plead guilty, 43% more likely to be
sentenced to jail, and receive jail sentences that are more than twice the average sentence); see
also Megan Stevenson, Distortion of Justice: How the Inability to Pay Bail Affects Case Outcomes
1, 18 (2016) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=2777615 (showing that that pretrial detention leads to a 13% increase in the likelihood of
being convicted compared to similarly situated persons who were released before adjudication).
See generally Stevenson & Mayson, supra note 7.
67.
Logan & Wright, supra note 12, at 1190–92. See Fagan & Ash, supra note 12.
68.
See, e.g., Natapoff Chapter, supra note 6.
69
Fagan & Ash, supra note 12, tbl.10.
70.
For an example of the burdens of pretrial bail, see Arpit Gupta, Christopher Hansman &
Ethan Frenchman, The Heavy Costs of High Bail: Evidence from Judge Randomization 45 J. LEGAL
STUD. 471, 472 (2016).
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simply to answer the summons. If these processing fees—taxes, in effect—are
skewed racially by selective enforcement targeting Black or Latino persons—
or neighborhoods with high concentrations of Black and Latino residents—
the Sixth Amendment concerns multiply, raising both due process and equal
protection claims under the Fourteenth Amendment.71 Costs to the defendant,
usually Black or Latino, are exacted through court appearances.
Because these pre-adjudication processing fees are not technically
punishment, their status exempts them from constitutional scrutiny under the
Eighth Amendment. They may, however, interfere with a defendant’s rights
under the Sixth Amendment.72 For example, poor defendants may be unable to
pay for filing fees to determine their eligibility for indigent defense. Exercising
the right to obtain a lawyer at the state’s expense cannot constitutionally be
conditioned on ability to pay.73 In arguing their case, poor defendants may
be unable to pay fees to obtain documents such as medical, employment, or
housing records. The cost of this tax is a disadvantage at adjudication and a
greater risk of conviction and its associated burdens.
B. A POVERTY TAX
The onset of New Policing reached deeply into the lives and the pockets of
mostly poor and predominantly minority citizens,74 potentially deepening any
pre-existing impoverishment75 while aggravating racial disparities in criminal
justice.76 The expansion of misdemeanor justice collided with the new forms
of taxation on criminal offenders to multiply the reach of New Policing to
penetrate minority communities significantly more often and more intensively
than in predominantly White communities. For example, an analysis of 27
independent datasets showed that non-Whites were nearly one-third more
likely (26% as compared to 20%) than Whites to be arrested.77 Other empirical

71.
See, e.g., HARRIS, supra note 12.
72.
Logan & Wright, supra note 12, at 1224.
73.
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 343–44 (1963).
74.
HARRIS, supra note 12, at 11–12; see also Logan & Wright, supra note 12, at 1177.
75.
AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, IN FOR A PENNY: THE RISE OF AMERICA’S NEW DEBTORS’ PRISONS
6–10 (2010), https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/InForAPenny_web.pdf.
76.
HARRIS, supra note 12, at 14–15, 156; see also Logan & Wright, supra note 12, at 1177.
77.
Tammy Rinehart Kochel, David B. Wilson & Stephen D. Mastrofski, Effect of Suspect Race
on Officers’ Arrest Decisions, 49 CRIMINOLOGY 473, 490–91 (2011).
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studies confirm racial or community influences on the decision to arrest.78
Stops and arrests also spill over to bias in the form of exclusions from serving on
juries,79 or college enrollment, attendance and achievement.80 In other words,
stops and arrests will beget stops and arrests and “spillover discrimination,”
simply by stigmatizing a neighborhood or smaller area as a “high-crime area.”
A connecting thread between large and small cities is the expanding net
of legal, social, and economic consequences of misdemeanor arrests and
convictions: a criminal record; an immigration hold and detention leading
perhaps to deportation; eviction from public housing or failure to meet rent
obligations; suspension of driving privileges; disruptions in employment or
schooling; and child-custody disruption.81 For those unable to post bond, a
pretrial spell in jail can bias later proceedings toward harsher dispositions and
sentences.82 Failure to be present at any of a sequence of court dates can lead
to a warrant and criminal arrest. In the wider community, harsh enforcement
of minor disorder violations takes a psychological toll. Persistent “crackdowns”

78.
See, e.g., David S. Kirk, The Neighborhood Context of Racial and Ethnic Disparities in
Arrest, 45 DEMOGRAPHY 55 (2008); Karen F. Parker, Brian J. Stults & Stephen K. Rice, Racial
Threat, Concentrated Disadvantage and Social Control: Considering the Macro-Level Sources of
Variation in Arrests, 43 CRIMINOLOGY 1111 (2005); Douglas A. Smith, Christy A. Visher & Laura
A. Davidson, Equity and Discretionary Justice: The Influence of Race on Police Arrest Decisions, 75
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 234 (1984).
79.
Vida B. Johnson, Arresting Batson: How Striking Jurors Based on Arrest Records Violates
Batson, 34 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 387, 412-14 (2016) (showing how prosecutors use prior arrests
of prospective jurors as race-neutral explanations to justify peremptory strikes of Blacks during
voire dire).
80.
Alex O. Widdowson, Sonja E. Siennick & Carther Hay, The Implications of Arrest for
College Enrollment: An Analysis of Long-Term Effects and Mediating Mechanisms, 54 CRIMINOLOGY
621, 624–26 (2016) (showing that arrested youth were 9% less likely than non-arrested youth to
enroll in a four-year college within a decade after high school graduation).
81.
See K. Babe Howell, Broken Lives from Broken Windows: The Hidden Costs of Aggressive
Order-Maintenance Policing, 33 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 271, 300–06 (2009); see also Eisha
Jain, Arrests as Regulation, 67 STAN. L. REV. 809, 820–44 (2015) (discussing the consequences of
arrests); Gabriel J. Chin, “Collateral Consequences of Criminal Conviction,” in Volume 4 of the
present Report.
82.
Cassia Spohn, Race, Sex, and Pretrial Detention in Federal Court: Indirect Effects and
Cumulative Disadvantage, 57 KAN. L. REV. 879, 880, 895 (2008); Marian R. Williams, The Effect of
Pretrial Detention on Imprisonment Decisions, 28 CRIM. JUST. REV. 299, 313 (2003).
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on the day-to-day activities of neighborhood residents in public spaces insert
police into the developmental landscape of children living in those areas,
leading to tensions and cynicism between citizens and police, even among
neighborhood children.83
In cities, as in suburbs and exurbs, movements of citizens are affected by police
tactics. When police routinely intervene in the everyday lives of citizens, they
impose social interaction costs that inevitably deter residents from moving freely.
And when these police actions produce legal and economic consequences for those
already in disadvantaged social positions, those consequences effectively lock
them in already disadvantaged places by constraining choices of neighborhood
selection.84 Even when a neighborhood changes for the better, it retains its status
relative to other neighborhoods that are changing simultaneously.85 Since police
deployments and actions are racialized and focused in poor and segregated
places, police in effect reproduce inequality, racial stratification and segregation
through criminal legal enforcement actions that can constrain mobility.
Linking policing to the reinforcement of racial boundaries is not new;
indeed, defense of property has been cited often in explaining police actions.86
One consequence of the New Policing, then, is to reinforce racial residential
segregation by deterring movement and burdening non-Whites with criminal
cases. This in turn leads to additional types of taxation. First, the blocking
effects of segregation on mobility serve to consign those living in segregated
neighborhoods to long-term exposure to a set of social and psychological
toxins that reinforce the individual and collective disadvantages of these

83.
Jeffrey Fagan & Tom R. Tyler, Legal Socialization of Children and Adolescents, 18 SOC.
JUST. RES. 217, 229–31 (2005); see also PATRICK SHARKEY, STUCK IN PLACE: URBAN NEIGHBORHOODS
AND THE END OF PROGRESS TOWARD RACIAL EQUALITY 150, 157 (2013) (showing that the presence of
police is part of a spectrum of persistent disadvantages facing residents in Black poor minority
neighborhoods).
84.
Robert J. Sampson & Patrick Sharkey, Neighborhood Selection and the Social Reproduction
of Concentrated Inequality, 45 DEMOGRAPHY 1, 20–21 tbl.4 (2008) (showing the intergenerational
reproduction of racial inequality through constrained mobility pathways that vary by race and
ethnicity).
85.
Robert J. Sampson & Jeffrey D. Morenoff, Durable Inequality: Spatial Dynamics, Social
Processes, and the Persistence of Poverty in Chicago Neighborhoods, in POVERTY TRAPS 176, 199
(Samuel Bowles et al. eds., 2006).
86.
Raising the costs for Black residents or visitors to move freely through either mixed or
predominantly White social spaces would ward off encroachments that might diminish property
value, or protect against property loss. Those motives, together with personal safety fears,
were drivers of the move toward segregation in early twentieth century St. Louis. See RICHARD
ROTHSTEIN, THE MAKING OF FERGUSON 3 (2014), https://perma.cc/2N27-CTHB.
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poverty traps.87 Perhaps most important is subsequent exposure to crime and
victimization. Across studies, there is a robust and persistent link between
racial residential segregation and neighborhood rates of violent crime. 88
Second, racial segregation and inequality impacts the economic lives of
Black persons in their access to capital and their ability to multiply it. Limited
access to capital reduces the ability of Black and other minority business
borrowers to invest and multiply their capital. One study of borrowing for
home mortgages showed that Black borrowers are 30% more likely to have
their business-loan applications rejected compared to White borrowers, after
controlling for a rich set of alternative factors including the borrower, the firm
and the characteristics of the lender.89
If the New Policing is reinforcing and deepening segregation, these empirical
studies suggest that it also is contributing to health disparities, higher risks
of mortality and crime victimization, and attenuated access to educational
and employment and economic opportunities, effects that are produced by
segregation.90 These deficits compound the direct economic burdens imposed
by New Policing and the regimes of legal financial obligations that can deepen
segregation. Together with poor housing conditions and limited access to basic
neighborhood amenities, segregation appears to have a churning effect on the
processes and structures that contribute to sustained economic disadvantage,
or the perpetuation of poverty traps through downward socioeconomic
mobility.91 In other words, New Policing contributes to being “stuck in place,”
or the cross-generational legacy of urban disadvantage.92

87.
Sampson & Morenoff, supra note 85, at 199 (“[N]eighborhoods remain remarkably stable
in their relative economic standing ... which means that the overall pattern of neighborhood
inequality did not change much over time [and that] further change is invariably in the direction
of greater racial homogeneity and more poverty.”).
88.
John R. Logan & Steven F. Messner, Racial Residential Segregation and Suburban Violent
Crime, 68 SOC. SCI. Q. 510, 510 (1987) (arguing for the consideration of “racial residential
segregation as an independent variable with important consequences for metropolitan
communities”); Ruth D. Peterson & Lauren J. Krivo, Racial Segregation and Black Urban
Homicide, 71 SOC. FORCES 1001, 1001, 1006 (1993) (showing evidence from 125 central cities that
“social isolation ... is the mechanism by which segregation leads to higher levels of homicide
among African Americans.”).
89.
Darius Palia, Differential Access to Capital from Financial Institutions by Minority
Entrepreneurs, 13 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 756, 777–78 (2016).
90.
For a detailed review, see Fagan & Ash, supra note 12.
91.
SHARKEY, supra note 83, at 114–15.
92.
Id. at 117.
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III. A REFORM AGENDA

The balance of costs and benefits from the New Policing suggests the
necessity for rethinking of these regimes. A program of reform can be
designed to link institutional and statutory design to the strengths of these
models but more important to mitigate their adverse effects. Some of the
proposed reforms suggest a regulatory design, whether through internal audits
and collaboration from within, or by regulation through political oversight.
Some may lead to other democratic processes with multiple stakeholders. In
extreme cases, reform may come through the last resort of litigation. Some
of the proposed reforms require activating available oversight mechanisms,
while other reforms suggest the creation either of new entities or methods to
integrate the missions and activities of existing ones. Some reforms will require
statute, others administrative regulation. Some will require the involvement of
professional oversight groups. Most will be cost-free, although for cities like
Ferguson, there are important measures to limit revenue derived from fines
and fees, requiring some hard choices in municipal budgets. These tradeoffs
are necessary to mitigate harms.
A. CAP REVENUE FROM TRAFFIC AND NON-TRAFFIC FINES
Missouri passed SB 5 in 2015, legislation that mitigated harms to motorists
in two ways. The first was aimed at persons who received tickets or summons.
The bill limits fines imposed when combined with court costs to $300 for minor
traffic violations.93 The bill also creates a provision for taxpayers to request an
income-tax offset for the amounts of unpaid court costs, fines, fees and other
amounts ordered by a municipality in excess of $25.94 These provisions are
aimed at minimizing the criminal justice “tax” on persons resulting from the
excesses of the New Policing. A second provision of the bill, called Mack’s Creek
Law, lowers the cap on municipal revenue from traffic fines from 30% to 20%,
effective in 2016, and lowering the cap in St. Louis County to 12.5%.95
The downside of these measures is a potential shift in taxpayer burden
to homeowners and business owners, to make up the shortfall and ensure
continuity in police services. To avoid that shift in tax burden, a new bill, SB
572, was introduced and approved in 2016 that applies the same limits to fees
and fines imposed for non-traffic violations96 in Missouri SB 5. These measures
reduce the incentives for local government through its police to pursue the
93.
94.
95.
96.

MO. REV. STAT. § 479.353.
Id. § 479.356.
Id. § 479.359 (repealing § 302.341).
Such as high weeds or peeling house paint.
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revenue-generating “taxation” prong of the New Policing, and are a model
for other jurisdictions that may abuse their discretionary policing authority
to create revenue streams that benefit the municipality as well as the police
officers and courts imposing those fines.
B. ADJUDICATION OF GUILT AND SENTENCING
Managerialism in the criminal courts diminishes incentives for adjudicating
guilt or innocence and replaces those incentives with calendar management
and expedited court resolution.97 Court reforms that strengthen the ability of
defendants to defend against the charges and reduce the reliance on pleas are
important to reduce the criminal justice and poverty taxes imposed by the New
Policing on those arrested. Several measures are needed to realize this goal.
1. Strengthen indigent defense to avoid reliance on pleas to close cases.
2. Develop race-neutral, risk-based instruments to determine pretrial
release eligibility and, failing to secure release, to determine bail amounts.
3. Take speedy trial rules seriously.98
4. Limit the number of non-appearances by police to two before dismissal
of charges.
5. Cap bail amounts within defendant means to pay.
6. Introduce means tests for fines to avoid default and subsequent
criminal arrest warrants.
7. Provide assistance for expungement of arrest records.
8. Provide advisory counsel for persons responding to summons for
ordinance and civil violations.
These measures are structural reforms that require policy levers more than
statutory change, as well as court rules that judges can impose in the interest of
justice for indigent defendants facing fines or jail. Their goal is to reduce reliance
97.
Stephen Bright & Sia Sanneh, Fifty Years of Defiance and Resistance after Gideon v.
Wainright, 122 YALE L.J. 100, 102 (2013) (critiquing the current state of courts as “plea mills:
courts of profit that impose fines without any inquiry into the ability of defendants to pay, thus
setting them up for failure and return to jail”); see also Kohler-Hausmann, supra note 6, at 643
(citing the flood of dismissals and heavily discounted sentences issued by judges “simply to
secure quick and easy pleas”).
98.
William Glaberson, In Misdemeanor Cases, Long Waits for Elusive Trials, N.Y. TIMES (April
30, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/01/nyregion/justice-denied-for-misdemeanorcases-trials-are-elusive.html?smid=tw-share (citing the abuse by prosecutors of “increasingly
elastic speedy-trial rules of the Bronx were finally stretched too far by delay after delay, prosecutors
would sometimes drop the cases as if they were never quite worth their time anyway”).

108

Reforming Criminal Justice

on pleas and the piling up of the secondary costs of a criminal conviction, costs
that can create impediments to social and economic stability and mobility. In
the case of summons, advisory counsel can assist respondents who may seek
to challenge the validity of a summons, or who can advise respondents of their
procedural rights with respect to payment.
C. INSTITUTIONAL REFORM
A number of mechanisms to mass data can be implemented to create
internal mechanisms to audit and regulate police activity. It is ironic that the
emphasis on metrics in the New Policing has not been redirected to measure
the performance and impacts of these policies on the lives of the policed. A few
common-sense steps, borrowing from education and medicine, can shed light
on the production of criminal convictions for the least serious crimes.
1. Require audits and reporting by state attorneys general.99
2. Ensure transparency and public access to data on the progression and
outcomes of cases, with details on the benchmarks.
3. Mandate a duty of responsible administration of policing as a matter
of due process, with remedies for violations.100
D. LITIGATION
Development of state-level statutes providing the remedies and relief
available under 42 U.S.C. § 14141, including civil-rights actions by states when
police are found to have engaged in a pattern and practice of violations.101
Litigation—whether through § 14141 or instead through claims brought
by individuals under 42 U.S.C. § 1983—is a last resort when democratic and
political oversight fails to remedy recurring civil-rights violations. But the
shifting political landscape in the U.S. Department of Justice suggests that
federal civil-rights litigation may by necessity give way to state actions.102
State actions have the advantage of leveraging the legitimacy of state elected
99.
The new legislation in Missouri has strong reporting requirements that mandate
accounting by municipalities of their police activity and linkages to their revenue streams.
100. See Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, The Duty of Responsible Administration and the
Problem of Police Accountability, 33 YALE J. ON REG. 165 (2016).
101. See Samuel Walker & Morgan MacDonald, An Alternative Remedy for Police Misconduct:
A Model State “Pattern and Practice” Statute, 19 GEO. MASON U. CIV. RTS. L.J. 479 (2009) (arguing
for a state law closely modeled from 42 U.S.C. § 14141 to effect change in local policing when
police create a pattern of violations of state constitutional rights).
102. Eric Lichtblau, Sessions Indicates Justice Department Will Stop Monitoring Troubled Police
Agencies, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 28, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/28/us/politics/jeffsessions-crime.html?smid=tw-share.
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officials in bringing about reforms to policing under state constitutional law.
Some state attorneys general have used state power in federal court under a
parens patriae doctrine to bring about police institutional reform.103 There
also are new models of local democratic oversight of police, some spurred by
DOJ consent decrees pursuant to § 14141, that have created new governance
structures that blend police and government interests with interests of citizens,
civil-rights advocates and lawyers, and police representatives to oversee all
facets of policing.104 In these instances, the work of local entities exercising
citizen review takes place in parallel with DOJ monitoring, but ultimately
supplants it once federal oversight ends.
E. COLLABORATIVE REFORM
Collaborative reform is an internal process where officers both at all levels
of the police hierarchy and across command units pool their expertise to
create new responses to complex crime problems. Crime problems in this
view are contextually embedded in social and spatial contexts, where crime is
common to a location. Crime problems may also reflect the acts of persons or
groups, requiring a different response. In each instance, the pooled knowledge
of multiple actors within police institutions, with diverse viewpoints and
experience, is applied in a problem-solving process to identify tactical responses
to crime problems. Cincinnati adopted a collaborative model in response to
civil-rights litigation over use of force in the early 2000s.105 The current model
has now been in practice for close to a decade.106 Reception by the police has
been positive, and the core tenets of the model—“problems are dilemmas to be
engaged in and learned from”—are deeply embedded in the police culture.107
103. See, e.g., People v. Town of Wallkill, No. 01-Civ-0364, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13364 at *19–
*20 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 16, 2001) (upholding attorney general’s parens patriae authority where legal
standards and practical difficulties made it unlikely that individual victims of police misconduct
could secure the sort of systemic, prophylactic injunctive relief sought); see also Jay L. Himes,
State Parens Patriae Authority: The Evolution of the State Attorney General General’s Authority
(2004) (unpublished manuscript).
104. J.B. Wogan, The New, More Powerful Wave of Civilian Oversight of Police, GOVERNING,
http://www.governing.com/topics/public-justice-safety/gov-police-civilian-oversight-oaklandseattle.html (last visited Mar. 25, 2017); see also JOSEPH DE ANGELIS, RICHARD ROSENTHAL & BRIAN
BUCHNER, CIVILIAN OVERSIGHT OF LAW ENFORCEMENT: A REVIEW OF THE STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF
VARIOUS MODELS (2016).
105. Sabel & Simon, supra note 100, at 193.
106. See Collaborative Agreement, In re Cincinnati Policing, No. C-1-99-317 (S.D. Ohio Aug.
5, 2002), available at http://www.cincinnati-oh.gov/police/department-references/collaborativeagreement/ (last visited Mar. 25, 2017); see also In re Cincinnati Policing, 209 F.R.D. 395, 400
(S.D. Ohio 2002).
107. Collaborative Agreement, supra note 106, at 2.
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The generalizable lesson from Cincinnati’s experience, which has been closely
monitored and studied by legal and social-science scholars, is the importance
of creating an integrated organizational design that shares expertise and
problem-solving responsibility among officers across ranks and commands,
and instantiates this ethos throughout the police organization. This is a sharp
departure from the traditional hierarchical and centralized decision-making
and strategic planning models in contemporary police institutions. The reform
process also illustrates a principle of “duty of responsible administration,”
where a comprehensive restructuring is a predicate to meaningful and effective
reform.108 These are not simple reforms, but these experiments are substantive
changes to the New Policing models of centralized and aggressive intervention
that seem to create harm with little to show for it.
F. MITIGATING HARM
The New Policing has several liabilities, beyond those illustrated in this
chapter. First, there have been 25 investigations into law-enforcement agencies
conducted since 2009 by the Special Litigation Section of the DOJ’s Civil Rights
Division (CRD) under 42 U.S.C. § 14141.109 The CRD is currently enforcing 19
agreements—including 14 consent decrees and one post-judgment order—in
counties and state agencies.110 Since the inception of “pattern and practice”
interventions in the 1990s, a total of 40 police agencies have entered into
either stipulated settlements or consent decrees, committing local police to a
series of court-supervised structural and policy reforms.111 Three others are
in negotiation now, in Ferguson, Baltimore and Chicago, but it is uncertain
whether they will be implemented by the DOJ under Attorney General Jeff
Sessions.112 This all has taken place in the era of the New Policing, with its
aggressive approach to less serious crimes and signs of social disorder.

108. Sabel & Simon, supra note 100, at 201.
109. Special Litigation Section Cases and Matters, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, https://www.justice.
gov/crt/special-litigation-section-cases-and-matters0#police (last visited Mar. 25, 2017).
110. Id.
111. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., THE CIVIL RIGHTS DIVISION’S PATTERN AND PRACTICE
POLICE REFORM WORK: 1994-PRESENT 3 (2017), https://www.justice.gov/crt/file/922421/download;
see also Goldie Taylor, More than 20 U.S. Cities are Currently under a DOJ Consent Decree, But
do They Really Work?, BLUE NATION REV. (May 27, 2015), http://archives.bluenationreview.com/
more-than-20-u-s-cities-are-currently-under-a-doj-consent-decree-but-do-they-really-work/.
112. Lichtblau, supra note 102; see also Ryan J. Reilly, Jeff Sessions Didn’t Read DOJ’s Chicago
Police Report—But He Thinks It’s “Ancedotal,” HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 28, 2017), http://www.
huffingtonpost.com/entry/jeff-sessions-doj-police_us_58b4a2eae4b060480e0b1ce6.
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Second, there is no reliable evidence of its overall effectiveness in reducing
crime. In fact, recent studies suggest that policing models that redirect attention
from policing disorder and focus instead on indications of actual and more
serious crime have stronger crime-reduction effects.113 Under the New Policing,
the yield for public safety is low if these low-level crimes or signs of disorder
are not gateways to violence or major property crimes. More important, the
standard of proof there is intrinsically low. In a succession of Supreme Court
cases in recent years, the reasonable-suspicion standard has expanded to include
pretextual stops (U.S. v. Whren),114 neighborhood characteristics (Illinois v.
Wardlow),115 “honest mistakes” leading to unlawful stops and arrests (Herring v.
U.S.),116 and unlawful stops that lead to arrests for outstanding warrants (Utah
v. Strieff).117 The bases of suspicion, in other words, have expanded beyond
the capacity of courts or police agencies to effectively regulate the power to
conduct investigative stops.
More important, the intrinsically low standard for investigative stops (and
the arrests or summons that follow) inevitably leads to police intervention
in inherently benign acts. This distracts police from intervening in the more
harmful ones. It is only in the narrow shared space where suspicion of more
serious crime overlaps with the general interest of the New Policing regimes
that it makes sense to intervene in the benign act at a lower standard of proof,
and the size of that shared space is part of a contentious debate. The social
harms from undetected harmful acts—when police are distracted from more
serious crimes to the less serious in the hope of discovering a more harmful
act—will far outweigh any private or small-scale benefits from intervening in

113. See John MacDonald, Jeffrey Fagan & Amanda Geller, The Effects of Local Police Surges on
Crime and Arrests in New York City, 11 PLoS ONE e0157223, 10–11 (2016); see also Fagan, supra
note 36.
114. 517 U.S. 806 (1996) (declaring that any traffic or vehicular offense or suspected traffic or
vehicular offense is a legitimate basis for a stop, no matter how pretextual the suspected offense).
115. 528 U.S. 119 (2000) (allowing presence in a high crime area to be a factor in police
decisions to conduct an investigative stop, without specifying the parameters of “high crime
area”).
116. 555 U.S. 135 (2009) (allowing a good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule when for an
arrest is based on erroneous information or negligent error).
117. 136 S. Ct. 2056 (2016) (allowing an arrest for an outstanding warrant even if the warrant
was discovered in an unlawful investigative stop).
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the benign acts whose connections to serious crime are tenuous at best. In
other words, do not sweat the little stuff, and focus on more serious acts with
more consequential public harms. This is simple regulatory algebra.118
This leads directly to the final recommendation: law enforcement and
citizen interests are better served by a recalibration of the jurisprudential and
operational basis for the New Policing’s standards to move them closer them to
a Mapp’s more exacting probable-cause standard,119 and moving away from the
more subjective reasonable-suspicion standard of Terry.120 A more workable
and easily understood standard for regulating police use of the stop power
would create a more comfortable space internally for police to monitor, audit,
and regulate compliance with constitutional law as well as internal policy. And
it can provide a standard that moves away from the subjective criteria that are
less vulnerable to cognitive error, perceptual distortions, and social harms.121
Secondary benefits for legitimacy and cooperation may well follow.
RECOMMENDATIONS
This section summarizes the major reforms for law and policy that this
chapter recommends:
1. Increase the specificity of the reasonable suspicion standard as the
basis for investigative stops to more closely approximate an exacting
probable cause standard.
2. Institute caps on municipal revenue from traffic fines and non-traffic
violations.
3. Strengthen indigent defense to avoid reliance on pleas to close lowlevel misdemeanor cases.
4. Use race-neutral, risk-based instruments to determine pretrial release
eligibility and to determine bail amounts.
5. Take speedy trial rules seriously by limiting the number of appearances
for adjudication of misdemeanors.

118. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, Burden of Proof, 121 YALE L. J. 738 (2011) (arguing that strong
evidence is necessary to assign liability or culpability since the proof burden can affect the design
accuracy of enforcement); see also Fagan, supra note 36.
119. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
120. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
121. Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 615 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (linking the low
seizure rates to Fourth Amendment violations in carrying out Terry stops).
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6. Develop state-level statutes providing remedies and injunctive relief,
including civil-rights actions by states when police are found to have
engaged in a pattern and practice of constitutional violations.
7. Create incentives for collaborative reforms between police and
community to revise non-productive and harmful policing strategies.
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Appendix Table 1. OLS Regression of Racial Differences in Stop Outcomes, 2004-2014
Stop Outcome
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

Suspect Race

Frisked

Unproductive
Frisk

Use of Force

Unnecessary
Use of Force

Arrest
Made

Black

.047***

034***

.021*

.028***

- .003

(.010)

(.006)

(.011)

(.008)

(.003)

.067***

.014**

.040***

.014**

.002

(.012)

(.005)

(.011)

(.006)

(.002)

.072***

.022***

.051***

.032***

.006*

(.008)

(.006)

(.010)

(.008)

(.003)

Sample
Restriction

-

If Frisked

-

If Force Used

-

N

4,811,769

2,519,934

4,811,769

1,076,575

4,811,769

Adj. R-sq

.228

.026

.052

.024

.014

White
Hispanic

Black
Hispanic

Significance: * = p<0.05, ** = p<0.01, *** = p<0.001.
Note: Average difference in rates of stop outcomes by race, relative to the average for
Whites and other races. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by precinct. Regressions
include year fixed effects and controls for the reason for the stop. Robust standard errors in
parentheses, clustered by precinct. Data include all stops for 2004 through 2014.
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Appendix Table 2. OLS Regressions on Sanction Rates for SQF Cases by Suspect Race,
New York City, Street Stops 2009-14 (Odds Ratios, SE)
N, %
Arrested

Black

142,596

1.08

5.9%

(.012)

117,425

.832

82.4%

(.062)

71,795

1.386

61.1%

(.079)

Conviction
Offensed

71,795

1.543

Felony

9.3%

(.113)

Misdemeanor

53.5%

Violation

37.2%

Sentencee

71,795

1.312

Time served
or no time

44.5%

(.079)

Fine or Probation

42.4%

Jail or Prison

13.1%

a

Arraignedb

Adjudicated or
Plead Guiltyc

Black Hispanic
***

1.047

***

(.011)
**

.717

1.389

***

1.453

***

0.98
(.064)

.850

**

1.277

***

(.065)
***

(.104)

**

ns

(.064)

(.085)
***

1.014
(.010)

(.058)
***

White Hispanic

1.878

***

(.072)

ns

0.939

ns

(.261)

Odds ratio is compared to White suspects. N=2,396,314 stops.
Significance: * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01
a. The total arrests recorded were 148,880. 7,500 cases were eliminated because of duplicate
or incomplete arrest identifiers. In addition, 146,323 cases resulted in issuance of a summons.
b. Models estimated with controls for age and gender, and fixed effects for year and arrest
charge. Models estimated conditional on probability of arrest or summons. Standard errors
clustered by police precinct
c. Models estimated with controls for age and gender, and fixed effects for year and
arraignment charge. Models estimated conditional on probability of arraignment. Standard
errors clustered by precinct.
d. Ordered logit regression of cases conditional on probability of conviction. Estimates
control for age and gender, and fixed effects for year and arraignment charge.
e. Ordered logit based on sentences of time served, fine, probation, jail, prison conditional on
conviction. “No time” includes conditional discharge. Models estimated based on probability
of conviction. Controls for age and gender. Fixed effects for year and conviction charge.
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Appendix Table 3. Logistic Regression of Race Effects on Stop Outcomes,
Ferguson, 2010–2013 (Odds Ratio, SE)
Stop Outcome
Driver
Ticketed

Arrest
Made

Vehicle
Searched

Contraband
Seized

Warrant
Arrest

Black-White
Odds Ratio

1.354+

1.928**

1.670**

0.744

3.241**

(Standard error)

(.236)

(.297)

(.235)

(.171)

(.921)

Sample Restriction

-

-

-

If Searched

If Arrested

N of Cases

11592

11592

11592

1203

951

Pseudo R-sq.

359

.063

.101

.041

.083

Notes. Standard errors in parentheses, p-values in brackets.
Significance: + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01. Robust standard errors clustered by arresting
officer. Models include controls for driver age and gender, officer assignment (patrol vs.
traffic), indicator for two officers with extreme level of stop activity, and the reason for
the stop. Column 4 is estimated conditional on a search occurring. Column 5 is estimated
conditional on an arrest being made.

